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Abstract
This paper investigates whether long-term finance affects the firm entry across the world.
We construct a new database on short-term and long-term credit provided by commercial banks
to the private sector in 85 countries over the period 1995-2014. We then analyze whether dif-
ferences in entrepreneurship are correlated with the provision of short-term and long-term bank
credit. Data on entrepreneurship are extracted from two frequently used databases: the Global
Entrepreneurship Monitoring dataset and Entrepreneurship Database, each of which captures
different aspects of firm creation. Econometric results indicate that long-term credit does not
stimulate the firm entry. On the contrary, we find that short-term credit exerts a positive im-
pact at each stage of firm creation from activity birth to registration. Our findings are robust
to a battery of sensitivity tests, including additional control variables, alternative dependent
variables, alternative sample, and changes in econometric specification. Our findings suggest
that better provision of short-term credit allows entrepreneurs to apply for a formal loan instead
of relying exclusively on informal loans or internal funds, contrary to long-term loans.
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1 Introduction
Entrepreneurship plays a vital role in a country’s growth and overall economic devel-
opment by creating new jobs, supporting the emergence of new products and sectors,
introducing innovation, spurring competition and productivity, and fostering knowledge
diffusion (Audretsch et al., 2006; van Stel et al., 2005; Wennekers and Thurik, 1999).
Understanding the institutional drivers of entrepreneurship is therefore of prime impor-
tance in designing effective policies.1 Existing papers have documented that, alongside
macroeconomic factors (Koellinger and Thurik, 2012; Wennekers et al., 2005), and busi-
ness regulation (Djankov et al., 2002; Klapper et al., 2006; van Stel et al., 2007), the
availability of external finance is one of the crucial determinants of new firm creation.
From a theoretical perspective, a deeper banking system allows lenders to mobilize
and allocate more resources to greater numbers of entrepreneurs, helping businesses to
overcome entry costs.2 However, short-term and long-term credit may play differing
roles in the development of entrepreneurship. Contrary to short-term credit, long-term
loans allow entrepreneurs delay repayment and provide them time to invest funds in
their business and earn profit. An entrepreneur relying exclusively on short-term credit
must rapidly generate cash-flows in order to meet repayment obligations. Therefore,
better access to long-term financing could help finance projects with delayed returns and
therefore could spur firm creation.3
However, one might raise doubts about the unconditional positive impact of long-term
finance. Banks are more reluctant to grant long-term loans than short-term ones. Loans
with longer maturity exacerbate asymmetric information problems (especially moral haz-
ard) and often imply larger loan amounts, generating higher risk for banks. Meanwhile,
1A large body of literature has focused on personal characteristics that affect entrepreneurship deci-
sions. Papers have focused on demographic drivers, socioeconomic factors, past experiences, education,
and/or psychological drivers (e.g., a lack of risk aversion, the need for autonomy, overconfidence). In our
analysis, made at the country-level, we concentrate on institutional drivers and neglect this literature.
2There are two additional theoretical channels through which financial development may spur firm
creation (King and Levine, 1993). First, as the financial sector grows, ex-ante screening by lenders
improves and high skilled potential entrepreneurs who lack funds can obtain financing and thus create
their business. Second, entrepreneurs are able to diversify risks more easily in more financially developed
countries. As a result, they invest in riskier projects yielding higher returns. However, there is no reason
to believe that short-term and long-term credit differ on these points.
3An alternative way to finance long-term investment consists on relying on multiple short-term loans.
However firms face a liquidity risk when they finance long-term investment with short-term debt because
creditors may refuse to roll over their credits (Diamond, 1991).
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entrepreneurs cannot easily provide lenders reliable information because they are unable
to produce hard information (such as certified accounts) and, if such is the case, have
a weak relationship with formal lenders (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1999). As a
result, long-term loans are oriented towards incumbents firms, at the detriment of new en-
trepreneurs and business ventures. Short-term credit can be more useful to entrepreneurs
in alleviating credit constraints because it is more accessible for borrowers who lack an
established credit history. Access to short-term loans can allow entrepreneurs to raise ad-
ditional funds at lower costs. In absence of short-term loans, potential entrepreneurs have
to rely on informal loans (from friends, family or moneylenders) or internal finance (sav-
ings), and are thus limited in their ability to raise sufficient funds for their entrepreneurial
endeavors.
This paper empirically evaluates the impact of short-term and long-term credit on
entrepreneurial activity. We firstly compile a new database on short-term and long-term
credit to private sector relative to GDP. We focus exclusively on credit provided by
commercial banks for two main reasons. First, data on other sources of long-term finance
are rarely available and are not comparable across countries. Second, bank lending is
the primary source of credit for entrepreneurs and young firms, especially in developing
countries. We define short-term credit as credit with a maturity of one year or less
and long-term credit as credit whose maturity exceeds one year. Our database on bank
loan maturity includes all countries (both developed and developing) for which we could
identify a consistent data source. The initial dataset covers 85 countries over the period
1995-2014, including 48 developing countries and 37 high-income countries.
We then investigate the relationship between long-term bank loan provision and firm
entry rate. We combine our database on bank loan maturity with data on entrepreneur-
ship at the country-year level. We consider two different datasets frequently used in
the literature on entrepreneurship: the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) dataset
and the Entrepreneurship database (ED). Each database captures a different aspect of
entrepreneurship. The GEM database focuses on the early stages of entrepreneurship. An
entrepreneur is defined as an individual that creates business (formal or informal; part-
time or full-time). The ED captures business registration and concentrates exclusively
on the formation of new limited liability companies.
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Our empirical approach copies recent papers that investigate cross-country differences
in entrepreneurship using panel data (e.g., Klapper et al., 2010; Klapper and Love, 2011,
2014). After controlling for potential confounding variables and country unobserved time-
invariant heterogeneity, we document that, contrary to short-term credit, long-term credit
provision over GDP has no impact on the firm entry rate. Interestingly, while the GEM
and ED databases often provide conflicting results, we find the provision of short-term
credit seems beneficial to spurring the creation of a new business (GEM) and registration
in the formal sector (ED). Our econometric results are robust to a battery of sensitivity
tests, including additional control variables, alternative dependent variables, alternative
sample consideration, and changes in econometric specification.
Our paper directly contributes to the extensive empirical literature on the impact
of banking development on entrepreneurship. While the theoretical literature is rather
unambiguous, the empirical literature does not provide robust proofs of the positive effect
of banking development on entrepreneurial activities. Studies based on household surveys,
often document a strong correlation between wealth and the propensity to start a business
both in industrialized economies (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Evans and Leighton, 1989;
Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994) and in developing countries (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al., 2011; Paulson
and Townsend, 2004).4 A related, albeit different, question is whether better access to
formal finance promotes entrepreneurial activities. Evidence from developed countries
demonstrates the positive effect of banking development on firm creation.5 Evidence
from other parts of the world is, however, less clear-cut. For instance, while Beck et al.
(2015) find a positive effect of external finance on a household’s decision to set up a
business in China, Elston et al. (2016) underline the role of informal finance for Chinese
entrepreneurs. In another context, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al. (2011) show that access to
bank finance is not crucial in a decision to launch an entrepreneurship venture in Bosnia
4However, as noted by Hurst and Lusardi (2004), the positive correlation may only reflect variation
in unobserved characteristics such as ability, preference, or family background. After controlling for
these aspect, they provide some pieces of evidence indicating that the relationship between wealth and
entrepreneurial activities is not strong in the U.S. Recent evidence exploiting external shock on wealth
(e.g., Corradin and Popov, 2015; Schmalz et al., 2017), however, gives support to the importance of
wealth in entrepreneurship decision.
5These articles employ several methodologies including difference-in-difference framework (Aghion
et al., 2007; Klapper et al., 2006), natural experiments such as U.S. bank branch deregulation (Black
and Strahan, 2002; Kerr and Nanda, 2009), or sub-national analysis (Guiso et al., 2004). The general
conclusion of these works is the positive impact of banking development for firm creation.
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and Herzegovina. Put differently, entrepreneurs employ alternative sources of funding
such as informal finances (from friends, family, or moneylenders) or internal finances
(savings). Cross-country investigations do not really help us to provide a clear answer on
this issue. Klapper et al. (2010) report a positive role of financial development on firm
registration, but econometric results are weakly robust. Other papers (Klapper and Love,
2011; Klapper et al., 2015) indicate that new business creation is more sensitive to business
cycles in more financially developed countries, underlining the role banking development
plays in promoting entrepreneurship. Ho and Wong (2007), however, challenge this view.
They show that, the availability of debt financing, contrary to that of informal financing,
does not affect business creation. We try to reconciliate these divergent views. In this
paper, we document that total credit does not impact firm entry rate. However, this
conclusion is challenged when we distinguish between short-term and long-term credit.
Short-term credit tends to stimulate firm creation, contrary to long-term credit (that has
a negative, albeit statistically insignificant, impact on firm creation). The most plausible
explanation is that short-term credit complements informal financing and internal funding
and allows entrepreneurs to raise additional resources to finance their projects.
This work is also directly linked to the body of literature focusing on real impact
of long-term finance. Existing literature documents that firms with higher long-term
debt ratios grow faster than their counterparts (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998),
have lower growth volatility (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al., 2017) and suffer less from credit
contraction following a financial crisis (Duchin et al., 2010; Vermoesen et al., 2013). This
micro-evidence is in line with macro-evidence underlining the positive effect of long-term
credit on growth (Gbenyo and Kpodar, 2010; Valev and Tasic, 2008). To our knowledge,
we are the first to study the effect of short-term and long-term bank credit provision
on firm entry. By focusing on entrepreneurship, we challenge previous findings on the
beneficial impact of long-term credit on firm dynamics. The provision of long-term bank
credit does not help entrepreneurs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 displays the data and
Section 3 presents the methodology. Section 4 discusses the main results and Section 5
runs a battery of sensitivity tests. The final section concludes.
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2 Data
2.1 Bank loan maturity
This work is based on a new database that reports the maturity structure of bank credit at
the country-year level. Data were hand-collected from diverse sources including central
bank annual reports, supervisory department/agency annual reports, annual bulletins
and statistical digests. Although alternative sources of long-term finance (such as leasing,
venture capital and crowdfunding) are available for entrepreneurs, only credit provided
by commercial banks was considered, for two main reasons. First, data on other sources
of long-term financing are rarely available and, if so, are not comparable across countries.
Second, even if a large share of long-term finance is provided by markets and institutional
investors, entrepreneurs rely mainly on informal finance or bank credit to finance their
business projects (La Rocca et al., 2011). The use of non-banking sources for long-
term financing is rather the exception than the rule, especially in developing countries
(Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2017).
We break credit down into two categories. Short-term credit is defined as loans with
a maturity of one year or less and long-term credit as loans whose maturity exceeds
one year. Ideally, we wanted to employ a flexible definition of short-term and long-term
credit by considering different maturity thresholds (six months, one year, two years, etc.).
Unfortunately, in the majority of cases, raw data provided in annual reports or statistical
digests just broke out bank credit between short-term credit (less than one year) and
long-term credit (over one year). As a consequence, to facilitate comparison and increase
the number of countries considered we followed this break down. The levels of short-
term and long-term credit were initially reported in the current local currency amount of
each country. We transform the data by dividing these figures by current GDP in local
currency for each country-year. As a result, we get the ratio of short-term credit over
GDP and long-term credit over GDP. The total credit over GDP is the sum of the two
previous indicators and this variable is comparable to the usual ratio of credit to GDP
employed in many studies.6
6This procedure is similar to papers collecting the same type of data (Gbenyo and Kpodar, 2010;
Valev and Tasic, 2008).
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The database on bank loan maturity includes data on all countries (both developed
and developing) for which we were able to identify a consistent data source. The initial
database considers 85 countries over the period 1995-2014 (unbalanced data). The list
of countries, provided in Appendix A, comprises 14 low-income countries, 34 middle-
income countries and 37 high-income countries. The coverage over time of the database
is relatively good: there are only 12 countries for which we have less than 10 years of
data, and two countries (Comoros and Croatia) with less than 5 years of data.
Before employing our new database, we verify that it provides reliable data. To do
so, we compare the ratio of total credit over GDP reported in our dataset with the data
published by the World Bank (Beck et al., 2010) on total credit provided by banks to
private sector. Different tests confirm that our database on loan maturity provides a
close picture to that depicted in the World Bank database. First, we compare the ratio
of total credit to GDP computed as the sum of short-term and long-term credit with the
ratio of private credit to GDP extracted from the World Bank dataset. The correlation
coefficient equals 88 %. Second, we regress the total credit obtained from our database
to the private credit provided by the World Bank database. The estimated coefficient
is highly significant and its magnitude is around one. Finally, a simple comparison of
descriptive statistics indicates that the average of total credit represents 48% of GDP in
our database and 49% if we use data from the World Bank database (see the first two
columns in Table 1). Break down by income level and continent provides a similar result.
Basic descriptive statistics, displayed in Table 1, indicate that total credit represents
48% of GDP on average and that three fifths of loans have a maturity above one year.
Average values, however, hide large variations across countries. The level and percent-
age of long-term credit increases with the level of a country’s development, in line with
previous evidence reported by Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2017). For instance, long
term bank loans represent less than 5% of GDP and one third of total bank loans in
low-income countries but exceeds 50% of GDP and two thirds of loans in high-income
countries. Differences across continents, displayed in Table 1, reflect differences in terms
of development.
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Table 1: Bank credit maturity, by country group
Total credit Maturity breakdown Sample
WDI Author Short-t. Long-t. % of LT Nb of Nb of
to GDP to GDP to total loan Obs. Count.
All countries 48.1 47.9 14.7 33.8 60.0 1211 85
By income level
Low income 11.8 11.6 7.2 4.3 33.5 196 14
Lower middle income 22.5 22.7 10.5 12.3 47.0 171 14
Upper middle income 45.0 43.8 11.9 31.9 66.3 300 20
High income 74.2 71.2 20.2 52.2 70.2 544 37
By continent
East Asia & Pacific 86.6 91.1 35.2 56.0 64.4 78 6
Latin America & Caribbean 61.0 62.2 18.4 47.7 72.1 165 11
Europe & Central Asia 64.3 57.7 13.4 44.3 71.1 539 36
Middle East & North Africa 45.9 47.9 20.1 27.8 53.2 113 9
Sub-Saharan Africa 13.0 13.0 7.8 5.2 36.2 316 23
Figures are obtained using the complete dataset (85 countries, period 2000-2014)
Table 2: Bank credit maturity, by year
Total Long-term credit Short-term credit Nb of
credit % of GDP % of TC % of GDP % of TC countries
1995 53.7 30.9 57.6 22.7 42.4 12
1996 49.9 30.0 60.2 19.8 39.8 19
1997 38.0 22.4 58.9 15.6 41.1 29
1998 41.5 25.4 61.2 16.1 38.8 32
1999 37.7 22.6 60.1 15.0 39.9 36
2000 37.9 23.7 62.5 14.2 37.5 50
2001 37.0 23.9 64.6 13.1 35.4 55
2002 37.3 24.6 66.0 12.7 34.0 58
2003 38.2 26.1 68.3 12.1 31.7 67
2004 40.4 27.5 68.2 12.8 31.8 72
2005 43.0 29.7 69.2 13.2 30.8 75
2006 45.5 31.8 70.0 13.7 30.0 78
2007 49.6 35.0 70.6 14.6 29.4 80
2008 52.8 37.2 70.4 15.7 29.6 80
2009 55.7 40.0 71.9 15.7 28.1 82
2010 54.9 40.1 73.0 14.8 27.0 83
2011 59.0 43.1 73.1 15.9 26.9 76
2012 58.7 43.0 73.2 15.7 26.8 76
2013 57.7 42.1 73.1 15.5 26.9 77
2014 57.4 42.6 74.1 14.9 25.9 74
TC refers to total credit (sum of short-term credit and long-term credit).
Figures are obtained using the complete dataset (85 countries)
We observe an increase of long-term bank credit in absolute and relative terms from
2000 to 2014 (Table 2). The ratio of long-term loans to GDP rose from 23 to 42 from
2000 to 2014 and its share in total credit increased from 62% to 74%. In an unreported
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analysis, we scrutinize whether the increase of the ratio of long-term credit is a common
feature of both developed and developing countries. We show that the percentage of long-
term credit increases in high-income, middle-income and low-income countries (at least
after 2005 for the latter group). In addition, this trend is occurring faster in low-income
countries, suggesting a possible convergence of credit maturity. This trend appears rather
similar to that observed by Le´on (2018), highlighting the existence of a convergence of
credit structure.
2.2 Entrepreneurship
There are two frequently-used datasets designed to measure entrepreneurship across the
world: the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) dataset and the Enterpreneurship
Database (ED) from Doing Business. Contrary to the majority of studies on drivers of
entrepreneurship, we employ both databases and exploit their differences.
The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) is an initiative aimed at better under-
standing entrepreneurship around the world. The GEM defines an entrepreneur as an
individual who starts a new business or manages a young firm. The entrepreneur can op-
erate in the formal or informal sector and the entreprenarial activity can be a full-time or
a part-time business. Data are obtained using harmonized surveys across different coun-
tries. The entry rate is captured by the Total early-stage Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA)
rate which is the percentage of the adult population (18-64 year-olds) who are currently
starting a new business or who own or manage a young firm (less than 42 months).7
The second database is obtained from the Doing Business project. The Doing Business
project measures business regulations and their enforcement across the world and also
provides a dataset on entrepreneurship, called the Enterpreneurship Database (ED). This
database describes entrepreneurship as ”the activities of an individual or a group aimed
at initiating economic enterprise in the formal sector under a legal form of business”. In
other words, the ED focuses on firm registration as a legal entity (and therefore exclusively
on the formal sector). Data are extracted from national business registries. The business
entry rate is defined as the number of newly registered firms with limited liability per
7The GEM database is available at http://www.gemconsortium.org/. For a complete discussion of
the GEM data, see Reynolds et al. (2005).
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1,000 working-age people (ages 15-64).8
Table 3: Entrepreneurship rates from GEM and ED datasets, by country group
TEA rate (GEM) Business entry rate (ED)
Mean 25th Median 75th Obs Mean 25th Median 75th Obs
All countries 11.02 5.83 8.98 14.11 777 2.98 0.61 1.62 3.95 1,386
By income level
Low income 28.32 25.21 30.52 33.67 14 0.25 0.05 0.15 0.38 105
Lower middle income 17.55 10.23 15.55 22.47 68 0.88 0.22 0.53 1.00 315
Upper middle income 14.46 8.81 13.32 19.39 204 2.88 0.87 1.71 3.64 411
High Income 8.20 5.29 7.16 10.19 491 4.76 2.00 3.34 6.23 555
By continent
East Asia & Pacific 11.03 6.05 10.59 14.68 106 4.23 0.72 2.22 6.10 166
Europe & Central Asia 6.92 5.02 6.47 8.53 370 3.67 1.17 2.78 4.68 547
Latin America & Caribbean 17.36 13.08 16.72 21.01 155 3.15 0.71 1.73 3.23 256
Middle East & North Africa 10.37 6.53 9.4 12.79 57 2.00 0.53 1.19 1.96 121
North America 11.13 9.51 11.17 12.63 26 0.98 0.86 0.94 1.07 13
South Asia 10.57 9.08 10.59 11.49 13 0.52 0.05 0.11 0.39 85
Sub-Saharan Africa 22.53 9.14 25.60 33.23 50 1.61 0.16 0.59 1.25 198
Figures are obtained using the complete datasets
Both databases capture different aspects of firm creation and often describe different
realities (Acs et al., 2008). The ED focuses on firm registration and the firm entry into
the formal sector, while the GEM concentrates on business creation, irrespective of legal
status (i.e., formal and informal). Comparisons of the two variables of entrepreneurship,
displayed in Table 3, are interesting and corroborate those made by Acs et al. (2008).
First, the level of entry rate according to the TEA exceeds the rate of business registra-
tions. This is explained by the fact that the business entry rate considers only formal
registration, while the TEA rate also includes informal firms. Second, GEM data tend
to report significantly higher levels of entrepreneurship in developing countries than in
developed countries. The ED data present the inverse. In other words, they indicate that
there is more entrepreneurial activity in developing countries but that a lesser share of
firms operate under a formal status. Finally, the TEA rate and the business entry rate
are not correlated (ρ = −0.06). It is therefore not surprising that both datasets provide
8The ED is available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/entrepreneurship.
The ED previously circulated under the name of World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Surveys (WBGES).
For a complete discussion of the ED data, see Klapper et al. (2010).
10
conflicting results on the drivers of firm entry.9 Nonetheless, we observe in Figure 1 that
both the TEA rate and the business entry rate have increased over the past decade. As
expected (Klapper and Love, 2011), the level of new business registrations has been im-
pacted by the Global Financial Crisis but the Total early-stage Entrepreneurial Activity
rate does not reach a similar decrease during this period.
Figure 1: Evolution of TEA rate and business entry rate (base 100 = 2002)
Studies often focus on one database because they are investigating only one aspect
that is related either to firm birth or to firm registration. Financial development may
a priori impact firm creation at each stage, from birth to registration. Credit availabil-
ity may play a role in firm creation before registration because entrepreneurs face sunk
costs (investment in physical capital, working capital needs, etc.). Financial constraints
may also limit an entrepreneur’s ability (and/or willingness) to register with a national
9An example, also valid in this paper, is the impact of growth that could stimulate firm registration
(and therefore entrepreneurial activity reported in the ED) but not necessarily entrepreneurial activity
reported in the GEM (because crisis period can induce an increase in informal activity).
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authority. By using both datasets, we are able to analyze whether short-term credit and
long-term credit alleviate constraints faced by entrepreneurs at the different stages of
entrepreneurship.
3 Methodology
To study whether bank credit maturity affects entrepreneurship, we follow the method-
ology employed in previous studies using panel data (e.g., Klapper et al., 2010, 2015;
Klapper and Love, 2014). We perform a simple empirical test to investigate whether a
country’s firm entry rate is related to banking development. To do so, we estimate the
following model:
Entryit = βFit−1 + ΓXit + αt + αi + εit (1)
where Entryit is a measure of entry rate in country i in year t using both indicators
provided by GEM (TEA rate) and ED (Business entry rate). Fit−1 is the ratio of private
credit to GDP (defined as the sum of short-term and long-term credit) in year t − 110,
Xit is a matrix of time-variant country characteristics (see below), αt is a matrix of time
fixed effects and αi is an unobservable country-specific effect.
In a second step, we rerun the same model by splitting total credit over GDP between
short-term credit to GDP and long-term credit to GDP as follows:
Entryit = βSTF
ST
it−1 + βLTF
LT
it−1 + ΓXit + αt + αi + εit (2)
where F STit−1 is the ratio of short-term credit to GDP and F
LT
it−1 is the ratio of long-term
credit to GDP in country i in year t − 1. Greater availability of long-term credit (resp.
short-term credit) is beneficial for firms’ entry if βLT > 0 (resp. βST > 0).
We run two different estimation methods to control for unobserved cross country het-
erogeneity: a random-effect model and a fixed-effect model. The random-effect model
assumes that the unobservable individual effects (αi) are random variables that are dis-
tributed independently of the regressors. This model allows us to exploit both within-
10The ratio of credit to GDP is entered with one lag to limit endogeneity issue. We also run a model
using contemporaneous values of credit variables. Results are unchanged.
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and between-variation but is potentially biased due to the presence of any unobserved
time-invariant difference between countries that affects both financial development and
entry rate. Inclusion of country fixed-effects (in place of random-effect) allows us to
control for this potential source of endogeneity but only exploits the within variation.
An important consideration is the need to isolate the impact of financial development
from other country characteristics. The inclusion of country fixed effects allows us to
control for all time-invariant country characteristics but we also control for time-variant
country factors (Xct). First, we control for economic development by adding GDP per
capita because both long-term credit and entrepreneurship (Wennekers et al., 2005) are
potentially correlated with the level of development. Second, we add the (lagged) growth
rate of real GDP because both the level of financial development (due to higher demand
for financial services) and firm entry (Koellinger and Thurik, 2012) can be affected by
business cycles. Finally, the degree of financial deepening, especially for long-term credit,
is potentially related to the business environment that a given entrepreneur is operating
in a given country. We therefore include several indicators of business environment ex-
tracted from Doing Business.11 Specifically, we consider the required procedures to start
a business, the costs to enforce contract, procedures for registering property, and the cost
of resolving insolvency. We consider additional control variables in the robustness checks.
Details about variable definitions are given in Appendix A and descriptive statistics are
reported in Table 4.
Data for 108 countries are available from on TEA and from ED for 137 countries.
However, due to the lack of explanatory variables for many countries, our final sample
includes only 43 countries (period: 2005-2015, 251 observations) when we employ the
TEA rate (GEM dataset) and 57 countries (period: 2005-2014, 451 observations) when
we explain the business entry rate (ED dataset). The list of countries is reported in
Appendix A.
11Data are available at: http://www.doingbusiness.org.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Models using GEM data
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
TEA rate 251 8.978008 6.173737 2.44 38.55
Total credit/GDP 251 68.07062 30.81505 5.915368 143.6752
Short-term credit/GDP 251 15.91691 10.56697 2.686329 57.80505
Long-term credit/GDP 251 52.71039 27.25711 1.154395 117.0423
Growth 251 1.816135 3.508607 -12.90611 12.92044
GDP per capita (in log) 251 9.802266 .9572759 6.418737 11.58387
Start a business 251 1.762163 .4993057 .6931472 2.70805
Registering property 251 1.656507 .4829481 0 2.639057
Enforcing contract 251 3.488484 .1613658 3.044523 3.850147
Resolving insolvency 251 54.31195 21.86951 0 90.2
Panel B: Models using ED data
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Business entry rate 451 3.195171 2.951785 .0084 17.2608
Total credit/GDP 451 56.69467 32.3901 7.224331 143.6752
Short-term credit/GDP 451 14.03796 9.02198 2.491565 53.65152
Long-term credit/GDP 451 42.65667 28.26732 2.67105 117.0423
Growth 451 2.682963 4.359845 -14.55986 23.63913
GDP per capita (in log) 451 9.100367 1.289032 5.994983 11.62597
Start a business 451 1.891125 .4478498 .6931472 2.772589
Registering property 451 1.647574 .4767572 0 2.639057
Enforcing contract 451 3.540674 .1826104 3.044523 3.931826
Resolving insolvency 451 42.41264 22.4503 0 90.2
4 Baseline resuls
In this section, we empirically explore the relationship between financial development
and firm entry rate shown in Table 5. Columns (1-3) present our results using the Total
Entrepreneurial Activity (GEM dataset), and columns (4-6) present the results using the
business entry rate (ED dataset). We first display results using pooled OLS in columns
(1) and (4) for sake of transparency. We then consider country heterogeneity by using
a random-effect model (results shown in columns (2) and (5)) and a fixed-effect model
(results shown in columns (3) and (6)). Our main interest variable, namely the ratio of
total credit over GDP, is not statistically significant when we control for country hetero-
geneity, irrespective of the measure of entrepreneurship considered or method employed
(random- or fixed-effects). This finding is in line with previous studies using the GEM
dataset (Ho and Wong, 2007) and the ED dataset (Klapper et al., 2010, 2015), both of
which fail to show a robust impact of financial depth on entrepreneurship.
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Table 5: The determinants of entrepreneurship and total credit
TEA rate (GEM data) Business entry rate (ED data)
OLS RE FE OLS RE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total credit/GDP (lagged) -0.0324** -0.0116 0.00216 0.0143** 0.00722 0.00377
(-2.07) (-0.41) (0.07) (2.01) (1.02) (0.55)
Growth (lagged) 0.0323 0.0220 0.0154 0.126*** 0.0570*** 0.0514**
(0.23) (0.20) (0.16) (2.83) (2.89) (2.45)
GDP per capita (lagged) -2.900*** -2.742** 7.463 0.862*** 1.192*** 1.793
(-4.00) (-2.18) (1.29) (7.08) (3.89) (1.23)
Start a business 1.656* 0.879 1.016 -2.033*** 0.371 0.544
(1.90) (0.95) (1.09) (-4.60) (0.86) (1.24)
Registering property -1.043 -0.410 -0.715 -0.829*** -0.486 -0.486
(-1.31) (-0.39) (-0.74) (-3.04) (-1.07) (-0.93)
Enforcing contract -5.414** 5.050 14.34 -0.630 2.084 5.635
(-2.08) (0.77) (1.53) (-0.87) (0.95) (1.28)
Resolving insolvency 0.00526 0.0198 -0.00921 -0.0324*** -0.00326 -0.00240
(0.24) (0.54) (-0.21) (-4.00) (-0.26) (-0.17)
Obs. 251 251 251 451 451 451
Country 43 43 43 57 57 57
R2 0.320 0.849 0.293 0.922
The dependent variable is the Total Entrepreneurial Activity rate provided by the Global Entrepreneurship
Monitor database in columns (1-3) and the business entry rate provided by the Entrepreneurship Database
in columns (4-6). Dummies for each year are included but not reported in all specifications. OLS refers to
pooled OLS, RE to panel random-effect model, and FE to fixed-effect model. Standard errors are clustered
at the country-level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Next, we examine the differential impact of short-term and long-term credit on en-
trepreneurship. We remove total credit over GDP and include both short-term credit over
GDP and long-term credit over GDP, as documented in Eq. 2. Econometric results are
displayed in Table 6. Coefficients associated with long-term credit are often negative but
are never statistically significant at the usual threshold. On the contrary, we find that
coefficients associated with the ratio of short-term credit are statistically significant and
positive. Irrespective of the econometric methods or entrepreneurship indicators consid-
ered, the rate of firm entry is higher when the provision of short-term credit increases.
The economic impact of short-term credit is far from negligible. A one standard deviation
increase of short-term credit raises the TEA rate by almost 1.5 points (16% of the TEA
mean) and the business entry rate by 0.66 points (20% of the mean of the business entry
rate).12 Analysis of control variables indicates that growth has a positive impact on firm
registration but not on business creation. We fail to prove a close relationship between
the business environment and entrepreneurship.
In a nutshell, our findings indicate that the provision of short-term credit helps new
firms to overcome sunk costs induced by the creation of a new business (such as working
12Economic significance is computed using coefficients reported in fixed-effect models (columns (3) and
(6) in Table 6).
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Table 6: The determinants of entrepreneurship and credit by maturity
TEA rate (GEM data) Business entry rate (ED data)
OLS RE FE OLS RE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Short-term credit/GDP (lagged) 0.0838** 0.130** 0.141* -0.0303** 0.0561** 0.0738**
(2.39) (2.11) (1.72) (-2.27) (2.23) (2.46)
Long-term credit/GDP (lagged) -0.0589*** -0.0424 -0.0220 0.0131 -0.00421 -0.00968
(-3.41) (-1.28) (-0.52) (1.43) (-0.50) (-1.05)
Growth (lagged) 0.0823 0.0359 0.0302 0.109** 0.0575*** 0.0538***
(0.56) (0.31) (0.30) (2.52) (3.01) (2.86)
GDP per capita (lagged) -2.903*** -2.840** 7.070 0.997*** 1.112*** 1.311
(-3.98) (-2.30) (1.18) (10.21) (3.59) (0.85)
Start a business 1.815** 0.874 0.908 -0.975*** 0.432 0.510
(2.12) (0.93) (0.91) (-2.70) (0.99) (1.14)
Registering property -0.254 0.0297 -0.514 -0.826*** -0.559 -0.575
(-0.30) (0.02) (-0.35) (-2.98) (-1.13) (-0.94)
Enforcing contract -8.695*** 0.957 9.318 -0.534 1.391 4.874
(-3.15) (0.15) (1.14) (-0.67) (0.61) (1.04)
Resolving insolvency 0.00866 0.0118 -0.0126 -0.0325*** -0.00711 -0.00325
(0.40) (0.34) (-0.31) (-4.41) (-0.58) (-0.22)
Obs. 251 251 251 451 451 451
Country 43 43 43 57 57 57
R2 0.361 0.856 0.230 0.906
The dependent variable is the Total Entrepreneurial Activity rate provided by the Global Entrepreneurship
Monitor database in columns (1-3) and the business entry rate provided by the Entrepreneurship Database
in columns (4-6). Dummies for each year are included but not reported in all specifications. OLS refers to
pooled OLS, RE to panel random-effect model, and FE to fixed-effect model. Standard errors are clustered
at the country-level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
capital needs, small investment, etc.). We also document that entrepreneurs are more
willing to register as a limited liability company when short-term credit is more readily
available. This latter result could be explained not only by the costs induced by regis-
tration procedures but also by a demand channel: firms may expect to have access to
formal finance in countries where short-term credit is easily available. Unfortunately,
we are unable to distinguish between these two possible explanations. However, our
findings illustrate that long-term credit does not affect entry of new firms. One possible
explanation for this is the inability of new firms to get access to long-term bank financing.
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5 Robustness checks
We run several sensitivity tests to confirm our baseline findings. We start by including
alternative control variables that could affect both the firm entry rate and the provision
of long-term bank loans and present our results in Table 7. First, the absence of the
impact of long-term credit may be explained by the negative impact of household credit
on firm creation. Even if we cannot quantify it, a large share of long-term finance is
dedicated to mortgage loans and therefore long-term bank credit may evolve as credit
to households. Meanwhile, a recent but growing body of literature has documented that
household credit is detrimental for growth, even in developing countries (Beck et al.,
2012; Le´on, 2016). We therefore test whether our findings are robust to the inclusion
of the ratio of household credit over GDP (in columns (1-2)). The ratio of household
credit to GDP is extracted from the Credit Structure Database (Le´on, 2018).13 Results,
reported in Table 7, indicate that our conclusions are not altered by inclusion of household
credit as an additional control variable. Coefficients associated with short-term credit
remain positive and statistically significant, while coefficients associated with long-term
credit are not statistically significant. Household credit has a positive impact on business
registration (Panel B, columns (1-2)). This result is in line with Herkenhoff et al. (2016)
who suggest that consumer credit access matters for entrepreneurship in the U.S and that
entrepreneurs may divert household credit to alleviate their credit constraints.
We consider alternative potential omitted variables in Table 7. First, we include the
level of institutional quality (assessed by the synthetic indicator of the World Governance
Indicators) in columns (3-4) because entrepreneurship and long-term bank loan provision
are more likely in countries with better institutions. We also control for government
expenditures in columns (5-6). An increase in government expenditures may crowd-out
long-term funds for private sectors. Meanwhile, a high share of government expenditures
13The Credit Structure Database is available at https://sites.google.com/site/florianleon/
research/data. The ratio of household credit to GDP is not available for all countries, explaining
why we do not include it in our baseline model. We also test the sensitivity of this test by adding
firm credit over GDP without and with household credit. Results regarding our interest variables are
reinforced (coefficients associated with short-term credit is significant at the 5% level). But, surprisingly,
firm credit has a negative effect on entrepreneurship (measured by both TEA rate and Business entry
rate). One possible explanation is the fact that an increase in firm credit may favor incumbents at the
detriment of new players.
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Table 7: Robustness checks, adding control variables
Panel A: TEA rate (GEM data)
RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Short-term credit/GDP (lagged) 0.143* 0.160* 0.118* 0.165** 0.129** 0.132† 0.126** 0.130†
(1.86) (1.90) (1.95) (2.05) (2.21) (1.65) (2.01) (1.68)
Long-term credit/GDP (lagged) 0.00275 0.0607 -0.0387 -0.0340 -0.0382 -0.0174 -0.0402 -0.0140
(0.04) (0.75) (-1.17) (-0.85) (-1.15) (-0.40) (-1.21) (-0.34)
Household credit/GDP (lagged) -0.0696 -0.129
(-0.76) (-1.24)
Governance (lagged) 1.815 -4.486
(0.84) (-1.32)
Government Exp. (lagged) -0.420* -0.410
(-1.88) (-1.44)
Inflation (lagged) -0.0948 -0.277**
(-0.84) (-2.45)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 243 243 251 251 251 251 244 244
Country 40 40 43 43 43 43 42 42
R2 0.851 0.858 0.859 0.863
Panel B: Business entry rate (ED data)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RE FE RE FE RE FE RE FE
Short-term credit/GDP (lagged) 0.0489† 0.0629† 0.0548** 0.0766** 0.0615** 0.0800** 0.0570** 0.0743**
(1.57) (1.67) (2.14) (2.57) (2.39) (2.65) (2.35) (2.60)
Long-term credit/GDP (lagged) -0.0386** -0.0465** -0.00414 -0.0100 -0.00335 -0.00885 -0.00332 -0.00821
(-2.16) (-2.25) (-0.49) (-1.11) (-0.41) (-0.98) (-0.40) (-0.92)
Household credit/GDP (lagged) 0.0545** 0.0591**
(2.15) (2.02)
Governance (lagged) 0.439 -0.296
(0.84) (-0.44)
Government Exp. (lagged) -0.0690* -0.0798*
(-1.83) (-1.73)
Inflation (lagged) -0.0236 -0.0279
(-1.29) (-1.51)
Obs. 409 409 449 449 450 450 445 445
Country 53 53 57 57 57 57 56 56
R2 0.903 0.906 0.907 0.906
The dependent variable is the Total Entreprenarial Activity rate provided by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor database in
Panel A and the business entry rate provided by the Entrepreneurship Database in Panel B. Dummies for each year as well as
the set of control variables (Growth, GDP per capita, contract enforcement cost, starting a business cost, property registration
cost and insolvency procedures) are included but not reported in all specifications. RE refers to random-effects generalized
least squares, and FE to panel fixed-effects model. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level. †, *, **, and *** indicate
significance at 15%, 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
may signal less pro-entrepreneurial policies and greater opportunity to be hired as a civil
servant. Finally, we control for the inflation rate in the last two columns. Inflation proxies
for macroeconomic instability, which could affect both entrepreneurship and financial
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deepening. Results, reported in Table 7, show that our main findings are unaffected by
the inclusion of these variables. Results also document that government expenditures
and inflation rates have a detrimental effect on entrepreneurship.
In Appendix B (Tables B1 and B2), we also control for characteristics of the financial
system. First, we consider the stock market development using the ratio of market cap-
italization to GDP. Indeed, the inclusion of stock market development proxies for direct
finance and for non-banking financial intermediaries that can provide (long-term) financ-
ing for entrepreneurs such as business angels or venture capital firms. We then consider
the degree of bank competition. In doing so, we include three frequently used measures of
competition (Le´on, 2015): the concentration ratio, the Lerner index and the Boone indi-
cator. All of these data are extracted from the Global Financial Development Database.
We also control for the share of foreign banks in the banking system, using data provided
in the Bank Ownership Database (Claessens and van Horen, 2014) and reported in the
GFDD. Finally, we consider the development of credit information sharing mechanisms
using Doing Business data.14 Econometric results confirm our baseline results. Coeffi-
cients associated with short-term credit are always positive (albeit not always statistically
significant when we consider the TEA rate), while long-term credit is not correlated with
firm creation. In addition, financial sector characteristics never affect entrepreneurship.
Next, we modify the dependent variable considered in Table 8. In Panel A, we employ
two additional measures of entrepreneurship provided in the GEM database: (i) the
percentage of the adult population (18-64 year-olds) who are currently starting a new
business (nascent entrepreneurs rate); and, (ii) the percentage of the adult population
(18-64 year-olds) who are owners or managers of a young firm (new entrepreneurs rate).
Econometric results indicate that short-term credit mainly exerts mainly its impact on
nascent entrepreneurs. The effect on the new entrepreneurs rate is less clear-cut. However,
in both cases, long-term credit has a negative effect, although not statistically significant.
In Panel B, we consider the logarithms of the business entry rate and the logarithm
of the total number of entry (without dividing by adult population) following papers
14The Global Financial Development Database is available at: https://data.worldbank.org/
data-catalog/global-financial-development. For credit information depth, we employ the old in-
dex ranging from 0 to 6.
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Table 8: Robustness checks, alternative dependent variable
Panel A: TEA rate (GEM data)
Nascent New
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RE FE RE FE
Short-term credit/GDP (lagged) 0.0498** 0.0861** 0.0479 0.0231
(1.98) (2.16) (1.63) (0.63)
Long-term credit/GDP (lagged) -0.0388** -0.0308 -0.0117 -0.0031
(-2.22) (-1.50) (-0.92) (-0.17)
Obs. 251 251 251 251
R2 0.810 0.808
Panel B: Business entry rate (ED data)
Log(number) Log(entry rate+1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RE FE RE FE
Short-terPm credit/GDP (lagged) 0.0189** 0.0159* 0.0091*** 0.0159*
(2.43) (1.69) (2.66) (1.69)
Long-term credit/GDP (lagged) -0.0078* -0.0061 -0.0012 -0.0016
(-1.77) (-1.44) (-0.79) (-1.03)
Obs. 451 451 451 451
Country 57 57 57 57
R2 0.969 0.948
The dependent variable is the nascent entrepreneurs rate in Panel A, columns (1-2)
and the new entrepreneurs rate in Panel A, columns (3-4) provided by the Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor database. The dependent variable is the logarithm of new
business and the logarithm of business entry rate provided by the Entrepreneurship
Database in Panel B. Dummies for each year as well as the set of control variables
(Growth, GDP per capita, contract enforcement cost, starting a business cost, prop-
erty registration cost and insolvency procedures) are included but not reported in all
specifications. RE refers to random-effects generalized least squares, and FE to panel
fixed-effects model. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level. *, **, and ***
indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
employing the same database (e.g., Klapper et al., 2010). Our results are unaffected by
these changes. Coefficients associated with short-term credit are positive and statistically
significant, and those associated with long-term credit are negative, although not always
statistically significant.
In a third step, we test whether our findings are sensitive to the sample considered.15
Results are displayed in Appendix B (Table B3). First, for both models we exclude
outliers (the 5st and 95th percentile of the dependent and interest variables) in Panel
15It should be noted that we try to assess whether developed countries differ from developing countries
using sub-samples and interactions specifications. However, we fail to provide a clear distinction between
these groups.
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A. Due to the limited number of observations, we do not exclude extreme values in
our baseline regressions. Second, for models explaining business registration, results can
be driven by offshore financial centers (Klapper and Love, 2011). We rerun the model
investigating the determinants of the business entry rate by excluding offshore financial
centers (OFCs). To select these centers, we consider the list provided by Zorome´ (2007).
We identify six OFCs included in our baseline model, namely Antigua and Barbuda,
Ireland, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta and St Vincent and the Grenadines. Our results
are not altered by the exclusion of these six countries. We also consider the most recent
list provided by the IMF that includes only Malaysia.16 Once again, our results are
similar when we exclude Malaysia. In Panel C, we exclude observations during the Global
Financial Crisis (GFC). Even if we control for time-dummies and lagged growth in our
baseline model, our results could be driven by this specific period marked by a contraction
of bank credit. However, our results are insensitive to this change.
Finally, we run a placebo test and change the econometric method (shown in Table
B4 in Appendix B). To ensure that our results are not driven by spurious correlations,
we apply a placebo test. To do so, we first classify all countries according to name. We
then attribute to each country the level of short-term and long-term credit of the country
classified just before it (in columns (1-2)) or after it (in columns (3-4)). For example,
for Niger in a specific year (e.g., 2010), we employ the New-Zealand data on short-term
and long-term credit in the same year in columns (1-2) and of Nigeria in the same year
in columns (3-4).17 Surprisingly, real values are partially correlated with placebo values
(coefficient equals 0.30). We show in Table B4 that coefficients associated with short-term
credit and long-term credit are not statistically significant in the placebo test, as expected.
Finally, in the last column of Table B4, we consider a dynamic panel data model. As is now
standard in the literature, we employ the GMM-system estimator proposed by Blundell
and Bond (1998).18 In Panel A, we consider the TEA rate from the GEM dataset. The
model passes the usual test but suffers from too many instruments (Roodman, 2009).
Nonetheless, econometric results are in line with our previous findings. In addition, the
16The list is provided at the IMF’s website: https://www.imf.org/external/NP/ofca/OFCA.aspx.
17We employ the complete dataset on bank loan maturity, reported in Appendix A.
18All explanatory variables are considered as weakly exogenous, and available lagged values are used as
internal instruments. We use the two-step procedure proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) and obtain
robust standard errors using the Windmeijer (2005) finite sample correction.
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lagged value of the TEA rate is highly statistically significant. In Panel B, considering the
business entry rate from the Entrepreneurship Database, econometric results are more
subject to caution. First, the model fails to pass the usual tests of autocorrelation (AR(2)
test). In addition, the absence of effects of all independent variables is explained by the
strong inertia in the business entry rate. Put differently, the lagged value of the business
entry rate captures all variation and no other variables are statistically significant.
6 Conclusion
This paper empirically explores whether short-term and long-term credit is beneficial for
firm creation. Although a large body of literature indicates that financial constraints limit
the entry of new firms, the impact of the provision of long-term financing for entrepreneurs
is theoretically ambiguous. On the one hand, entrepreneurs may benefit from long-term
financing to overcome entry costs. Contrary to short-term credit, long-term credit allows
entrepreneurs to invest in projects with delayed returns. On the other hand, one might
raise doubts about the positive impact of long-term financing if entrepreneurs are unable
to get access to long-term credit. Loans with longer maturity may be oriented towards
existing borrowers who have a previous relationship with a formal lender to the detriment
of new borrowers. According to this view, a better provision of short-term credit would
be more useful to alleviate the credit constraints of entrepreneurs because these funds are
more accessible for borrowers without credit history.
This paper empirically investigates the impact of long-term and short-term bank loan
provisions on entrepreneurship. In doing so, we confront a new hand-collected database
on bank loan maturity with data on entrepreneurship at the country-level. Data on short-
term and long-term credit granted to the private sector were collected on 85 countries,
including 48 developing countries and 37 high-income countries over the period 1995-
2014. Short-term credit is defined as credit with a maturity of one year or less and
long-term credit as credit whose maturity exceeds one year. We combine our database
on bank loan maturity with cross-country data on entrepreneurship from two different
datasets: the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) dataset and the Entrepreneurship
Database (ED). Both databases capture different aspects of firm creation and describe
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different realities (Acs et al., 2008). The ED focuses on firm registration and firm entry
in the formal sector, while the GEM concentrates on business creation, irrespective of
legal status (formal and informal). Contrary to the majority of studies on the drivers of
entrepreneurship, we employ both databases and exploit their differences.
Econometric findings document that long-term credit provision over GDP has no
impact on the entry rate. On the contrary, short-term credit exerts a positive impact on
firm creation. These results hold for both measures of entrepreneurship considered. In
other words, the provision of short-term credit is beneficial to spurring entrepreneurship
at each stage, from the beginning of a new business venture (assessed by the GEM data)
to registration in the formal sector (proxied by the ED). Results are robust to a battery
of sensitivity tests, including additional control variables, alternative dependent variables
such as household credit, alternative samples, and changes in econometric specification.
Our findings do not suggest that long-term credit is not useful for entrepreneurs. They
simply signal that short-term credit is more effective than long-term credit to alleviate
financial constraints faced by entrepreneurs. Better provision of short-term credit allows
entrepreneurs to apply for a formal loan instead of relying exclusively on informal loans
or internal funds. However, an increase in long-term loans does not help entrepreneurs
in their business if they are unable to produce hard information that qualifies them for
these loans. Long-term loans are certainly limited to previous (good) borrowers who have
previous relationships with formal lenders and/or credit history.
From a policy perspective, our findings indicate that facilitating access to short-term
finance can be of prime importance for stimulating entrepreneurship. This is crucial
because new firms create more jobs both in developed countries (Haltiwanger et al.,
2013) and in developing countries (Ayyagari et al., 2014; Rijkers et al., 2014).
Form a research perspective, we can suggest three ways for future works. First, it could
be useful to confirm our conclusions by employing micro-evidence. Second, as underlined
by King and Levine (1993), banking development can affect entrepreneurial activity not
only by increasing the amount of funding dedicated to entrepreneurs but also through
screening improvement and risk diversification. To our knowledge there is no paper that
disentangles these three channels. Our paper’s finding suggests that banking development
affects entrepreneurial activities through resources allocated to entrepreneurs. Indeed,
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contrary to long-term loans, short-term credit is more easily allocated for new borrowers.
However, our findings just provide a simple suggestion on the channel through which
finance impacts entrepreneurship. Future works should focus explicitly on disentangling
the three channels through which financial development can be related to entrepreneurial
activities. Finally, external funds are important because they influence not only the
ability of individuals to enter into markets, but also post-entry development of firms
(Aghion et al., 2007; Beck et al., 2008). In spite of a lack of impact on firm creation,
long-term finance could positively impact post-entry growth and survival probability. To
our knowledge, evidence is rather scarce on this subject and additional research is needed.
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Appendix A Sample and variable definition
Sample (list of countries)
Bank loan maturity database (85 countries)19
Albania (2002-2014); Algeria (1997-2014); Antigua and Barbuda (2000-2014); Austria
(2002-14); Azerbaijan (2005-2014); Bahamas (1998-2014); Barbados (1995-2014); Belarus
(1999-2014); Belgium (2001-2014); Benin (1997-2014); Bosnia and Herzegovina (2000-
2014); Botswana (2000-2014); Bulgaria (2004-2014); Burkina-Faso (1997-2014); Burundi
(2003-2014); Cameroon (2000-2010); Central African Rep (2000-2010); Chad (2000-2010);
Chile (1995-2014); Comoros (2013-2014); Congo (2000-2010); Coˆte d’Ivoire (1997-2014);
Croatia (2010-2014); Czech Rep (1995-2014); Dem. Rep. of Congo (2001-2014); Den-
mark (2000-2014); Djibouti (2006-2014); Dominica (2000-2014); Equatorial Guinea (2000-
2010); Estonia (1997-2014); Finland (2003-2014); France (1995-2014); Gabon (2000-
2010); Georgia (2001-2014); Germany (1995-2014); Greece (1998-2014); Grenada (2000-
2014); Guatemala (2009-2014); Guinea (2003-2010); Guinea Bissau (2001-2014); Hun-
gary (2003-201); Ireland (2003-2014); Italy (2005-2014); Jordan (2009-2014); Kazakhstan
(1996-2014); Kosovo (2001-2014); Kyrgyz Rep. (1996-2014); Latvia (2003-2014); Lithua-
nia (2004-2014); Luxembourg (1999-2014); Macao (1995-2014); Macedonia (1995-2014);
Madagascar (1996-2013); Malaysia (1996-2014); Mali (1997-2014); Malta (2003-2013);
Mauritania (2004-2014); Mongolia (2007-2014); Morocco (2006-2014); Netherlands (1998-
2014); New Zealand (2004-2014); Niger (1997-2014); Nigeria (2006-2014); Oman (2004-
2014); Poland (1996-2014); Portugal (1996-2014); Romania (1997-2014); Russia (2007-
2014); Rwanda (1999-2014); Saudi Arabia (1995-2014); Senegal (1997-2014); Serbia (1999-
2014); Singapore (1995-2003); Slovak Rep. (2003-2014); Slovania (1995-2014); St. Kitts
and Nevis (2000-2014); St. Lucia (2000-2014); St Vincent (2000-2014); Sweden (1996-
2014); Taiwan (2004-2014); Togo (1997-2014); Tunisia (1995-2014); Ukraine (2002-2014);
19In parentheses, we report the period coverage
29
Uruguay (2003-2014); Yemen (2005-2013)
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (43 countries)
Algeria, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bostwana, Bulgaria, Burkina-
Faso, Chile, Croatia, Czech Rep., Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany,
Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Macedonia, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Slovak Rep., Slovenia, Sweden, Tunisia, Uruguay, Yemen
Entrepreneurship Database (57 countries)
Albania, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Bostwana, Bulgaria, Burkina-Faso, Chile, Croatia, Czech Rep., Den-
mark, Dominica, Estonia, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Grenada,
Guatemala, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Rep., Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mongolia, Morocco, Nether-
lands, Nigeria, Oman, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Slovak Rep.,
Slovenia, St. Vincent, Sweden, Togo, Tunisia, Ukraine, Uruguay
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Variables definition
Table A1: Description of variables and data source (entrepreneurship)
Variable Description Sourcea
Dependent variables
TEA ratect Percentage of adults population (18-64 year-old) who are currently starting a new
business or the owner and managers of a young firm (less than 42 months).
GEM
Business Entry Ratect Number of newly registered firms with limited liability per 1,000 working-age people
(ages 15-64).
ED
Independent variables
Credit variables
Total credit/GDP Bank credit to the private sector over GDP, sum of short-term and long-term credit Own database
Short-term credit/GDP Short-term bank credit over GDP defined as loans with a maturity below or equal to
one year
Own database
Long-term credit/GDP Long-term bank credit over GDP defined as loans with a maturity above one year Own database
Control variables
Growth Growth of real GDP WDI
GDP per capita GDP per capita (Constant USD), in log with one lag WDI
Start a business Number of days to start a business (in log) DB
Registering property Number of days to register property (in log) DB
Enforcing contact Number of days to enforce a contract (in log) DB
Resolving insolvency Recovery rate (per USD) DB
Additional variables (robustness checks)
Household credit/GDP Bank credit allocated to households over GDP CSD
Firm credit/GDP Bank credit allocated to firms over GDP CSD
Governance Indicator of institutional quality WGI
Inflation Consumer price index variation WDI
Government Exp. General government final consumption expenditure WDI
Stock Market capitalization Total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP GFDD
Concentration ratio Assets of three largest commercial banks as a share of total banking assets GFDD
Lerner index Lerner index is the markup between price and marginal costs GFDD
Boone indicator A measure of degree of competition based on profit-efficiency in the banking market GFDD
Foreign banks The ratio of the number of foreign owned banks to the number of the total banks GFDD
Information sharing depth Depth of credit information index measures rules affecting the scope, accessibility,
and quality of credit information available through public or private credit registries
DB
aGEM: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor database; ED: Entrepreneurship Database; WDI: World Development Indicators;
DB: Doing Business; CSD: Credit Structure Database; WGI: World Governance Indicators; GFDD: Global Financial
Development Database
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Appendix B Robustness checks
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Table B3: Robustness checks, sample
Panel A: Outliers
TEA rate Business entry rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RE FE RE FE
Short-term credit/GDP (lagged) 0.135* 0.181† 0.0435 0.0696*
(1.78) (1.63) (1.38) (1.91)
Long-term credit/GDP (lagged) -0.0591* -0.0365 -0.0017 -0.0104
(-1.81) (-0.70) (-0.18) (-0.96)
Obs. 238 238 435 435
Country 42 42 57 57
R2 0.858 0.902
Panel B: Offshore Financial Centers
Malaysia OFCs
(5) (6) (7) (8)
RE FE RE FE
Short-term credit/GDP (lagged) 0.0546** 0.0737** 0.0223 0.0687**
(2.10) (2.36) (0.82) (2.02)
Long-term credit/GDP (lagged) -0.0035 -0.0097 0.0128 -0.0121
(-0.40) (-0.99) (1.51) (-1.03)
Obs. 441 441 409 409
Country 56 56 51 51
R2 0.905 0.912
Panel C: Excluding Global Financial Crisis period (2007-2008)
TEA rate Business entry rate
(5) (6) (7) (8)
RE FE RE FE
Short-term credit/GDP (lagged) 0.136** 0.149 0.0497** 0.0677**
(2.13) (1.47) (2.08) (2.13)
Long-term credit/GDP (lagged) -0.0461 -0.0215 0.0027 -0.0017
(-1.46) (-0.43) (0.31) (-0.18)
Obs. 216 216 354 354
Country 43 43 57 57
R2 0.872 0.912
The dependent variable is the Total Entrepreneurial Activity rate provided by the
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor dataset in Panel A and C (columns 1-2) and the
business entry rate provided by the Entrepreneurship Database in Panel A and C
(columns 3-4) and in Panel B. In Panel B, Malaysia indicates that observations for
Malaysia have been dropped and OFCs that offshore financial centers identified by
Zorome´ (2007) (Antigua and Barbuda, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Malta and St
Vincent) have been removed. Dummies for each year as well as the set of control vari-
ables (Growth, GDP per capita, contract enforcement cost, starting a business cost,
property registration cost and insolvency procedures) are included but not reported
in all specifications. RE refers to random-effects generalized least squares, and FE
to panel fixed-effects model. Standard errors are clustered at the country-level. †, *,
**, and *** indicate significance at 15%, 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table B4: Robustness checks, placebo test and dynamic panel model
Panel A: TEA rate
Placebo test Dyn. Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RE FE RE FE GMM-
One lag One lag One forward One forward Syst.
Short-term credit/GDP (lagged) 0.0403 0.0768 0.0275 0.0396 0.146**
(0.48) (0.68) (0.35) (0.33) (2.07)
Long-term credit/GDP (lagged) 0.0576** 0.0595 -0.0551 -0.0674 -0.057
(2.03) (1.29) (-1.42) (-1.03) (-1.17)
TEA rate (t-1) 0.628***
(3.44)
Obs. 182 182 221 221 210
R2 0.909 0.884
AR(1) 0.012
AR(2) 0.983
Hansen test 1.000
Nb. Instruments 151
Panel B: Business entry rate
Placebo test Dyn. Panel
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RE FE RE FE GMM-
One lag One lag One forward One forward Syst.
Short-term credit/GDP (lagged) -0.0352 -0.0395 0.00985 0.0316 0.010
(-1.56) (-1.31) (0.28) (0.61) (0.32)
Long-term credit/GDP (lagged) 0.0158 0.0169 -0.00358 -0.00903 0.012
(1.31) (1.10) (-0.44) (-1.12) (1.33)
Business entry rate (t-1) 0.985***
(12.28)
Obs. 363 363 427 427 454
R2 0.940 0.918
AR(1) 0.003
AR(2) 0.063
Hansen test 1.000
Nb. Instruments 141
The dependent variable is the Total Entrepreneurial Activity rate provided by the Global Entrepreneur-
ship Monitor database in Panel A and the business entry rate provided by the Entrepreneurship Database
in Panel B. Dummies for each year as well as the set of control variables (Growth, GDP per capita, con-
tract enforcement cost, starting a business cost, property registration cost and insolvency procedures)
are included but not reported in all specifications. RE refers to random-effects generalized least squares,
FE to panel fixed-effects model, and GMM-Syst. to Blundell and Bond (1998)’s estimator. Standard
errors are clustered at the country-level in random and fixed effect models and are computed using the
Windmeijer (2005)’s in GMM estimations (column 6). *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%
and 1%, respectively.
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